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Goh's Consensus Politics 
of  Authoritarian Ru Ie 
GARRY RODAN 
It would be overstating the case to depict Goh Chok  Tong as having transformed the nature 
of  authoritarianism in Singapore during his time as Prime Minister a~d  leader of  the ruling 
People's Action Party (PAP) between 1990 and 2004. YetGoh did significantly refine the 
regime through his "consensus politics". Goh's predecessor, Lee Kuan Yew,  had presided 
over the systematic obstruction of political opposition and the decimation of civil society. 
Against this background, and in the context of the city-state's deepening economic trans-
formation, Goh understood that Singapore's growing social pluralism required a political 
accommodation. Towards this end, Goh and his administration fostered new formal and 
informal political institutions and updated the ideological rationale for the de facto one-
party state. This included select avenues through which more diversity of views, criticisms 
and interests relevant to public policy could be expressed. Crucially, though, this generally 
involved expanding the political space of the state rather than any greater toleration of 
independent, collective organisations engaged in political competition with, or mobilisa-
tion against, the PAP. In other words, there was no dilution of authoritarian rule that, by 
definition, insulates power holders from genuinely competitive politics. Yet, paradoxically, 
increased political participation and consultation were integral to the structural and ideo-
logical refinement of authoritarian rule during the period of Gob's prime ministership. 
This was only the second major refinement to the authoritarian regime since its incep-
tion in the 1960s. The first was under Lee, whereby administrative and legalistic techniques 
assumed vital strategic importance to political controL Recourse to security laws to detain 
critics and opponents was largely replaced by lawsuits and clever use of administrative law 
and legislation to constrain political competition.! This increased sophistication coincided 
with the changing character of the PAP itself. An acute concentration of power among 
bureaucratic and political elites  had progressively taken place,  a  process rooted in the 
integration of state and party in the 1960s but subsequently given impetus by the matura-
tion of state capitalism. Goh, a former civil servant and managing director of the state 
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shipping company, Neptune Orient Lines, was emblematic of  this power concentration and 
narrowing leadership profile. Indeed, he was at the centre of  an emerging powerful group of 
state capitalists who increasingly occupied political positions or exerted political influence. 
Importantly, the technocratic world view with which Goh was imbued resonated with the 
administrative and legalistic instruments of  political control Lee had shifted emphasis to. 
Goh thus consolidated this process. 
While  during his  leadership  the  government  embarked  on  major  refinements  to 
authoritarianism, Goh appreciated that the regime was underscored by state paternalism. 
Since the early 1960s, PAP governments had cultivated heavy dependence on the state 
for social and economic resources. This relationship blocked independent bases of power, 
rendered Singaporeans vulnerable to potential political retribution such as through state 
discrimination in public housing upgrading and maximised the identification of social and 
economic progress with the PAP. As Prime Minister, Goh unapologetically exploited this 
relationship, both as a means of  political intimidation and of  political seduction. 
In short, Goh's creative crafting of  political institutions to foster new forms of  political 
participation combined with a consolidation of  the obstacles to effective contestation against 
the PAP. Yet in simultaneously prosecuting political change and regime consolidation, Goh 
did engender in many Singaporeans a sense that the political system was evolving for the 
better and that further evolution was possible. 
Expanding Political  Space, Restricting Political Pluralism 
At the 1984 General Election, the PAP suffered a 13 per cent swing against it. In the 
post-mortem, the ruling party concluded that a more complex and socially diverse society 
resulting  from  economic  development  necessitated  new  institutional  and  ideological 
responses. In effect, the capacity for political co-option needed revitalisation if political 
competition was to be contained. 
Although the PAP did not articulate it in these terms, the limited capacity of  traditional 
structures of  political co-option-including the PAP-linked Nati~nal  Trades Union Con-
gress (NTUC) and grassroots Citizens' Consultative Committees (CCCs) -to  incorporate 
new social forces  was a limitation of the existing authoritarian  ~egime. Furthermore, as 
material inequalities and living costs increased with capitalist development, the incapacity 
of these organisations either to forcefully represent the interests of lower-income Singa-
poreans or to placate them effectively also posed a problem for the PAP. Meanwhile, the 
contradiction between technocratic and elitist official rhetoric that championed meritocracy 
and a dearth of  opportunities for increasing numbers of  middle class professionals to exert 
influence over public policy was becoming more apparent. 
From the outset, Goh played a pivotal role in the updating of  the structures and ideolo-
gies of political cooption. As First Deputy Prime Minister, he initially mooted the idea 
of the Feedback Unit, which was introduced in 1985 by the Ministry of Community 
Development. This provided extensive and varied channels of political communication 
and consultation for the public that by-passed party political contestation. In the process, 
the opportunities for Singaporeans to work with the government towards improving its 
public policy were markedly opened up. The Feedback Unit initiative was informed by 
Gons.genuinely held belief that "What a plural society like ours needs is a tradition of 
government which emphasises consensus instead of division",  that includes rather than 
excludes, and that tries to maximise the participation of the population in the national 
effort, instead of minimising it':2 
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Charged for speaking without a public licence: Chee Soon Juan, 1999 
Yet another significant reform pushed by Goh before he became prime minister, and 
consistent with this vision, was the amendment to the Constitution in 1990 to create a new 
category of parliamentarians: Nominated Members of Parliament (NMPs). This arrange-
ment was first signalled in the President's speech at the opening of Parliament in January 
1989. Initially there was provision for up to six NMPs, each serving a potentially renewable 
two-and-a-half-year term and with limited voting rights. The number was increased to nine 
following the 1997 election. The President makes NMP appointments on the advice of a 
special select committee decided by the PAP-dominated parliament. Rhetorically, the initial 
emphasis was on the way such a system could draw on talented individuals and people 
with specialist expertise-which it in fact has often done. However, from the beginning 
the appointments were weighted towards functional representation of discrete interests, 
including domestic business, labour, women's  and ethnic organisations. This implicitly 
recognised the inadequacy of existing structures of political representation. During the 
1990s, the concept of functional representation was explicitly acknowledged and increas-
ingly broadened to include a range of  professional organisations and other interests. During 
his term as Prime Minister, Goh and the government-controlled domestic media regularly 
portrayed NMPs as superior parliamentary performers to elected opposition figures. 
The political participation and consultation Goh was promoting were an alternative to 
political competition, not a supplement or adjunct to it-a  point he underlined shortly after 
becoming prime minister. Goh stated at the time that it would take at least another 15 to 
20 years before Singapore society was cohesive enough to be able to afford a multi-party 
system.3 However, Goh boasted  just three years later that social cohesion was one of  the key 
factors behind Singapore's high economic growth,4 suggesting that he was disingenuous in 
claiming lack of  cohesion as an obstacle to a multi-party system. He subsequently explained 
that he had never subscribed to opposition politics, asserting that  "I don't believe in constant 
bickering and struggling for power".5 Indeed, such was his aversion for combative, adver-
sarial opponents that, in reference to the Singapore Democratic Party's Chee Soon  Juan, he 
warned of the risk of  "cancerous cells" being planted that could "infect" parliament.6 64  GARRY RODAN 
Importantly, Goh also provided the principal ideological refinement to the rationale for 
the one-party state through propagating and institutionalising ideas of  consensus politics. 
The theme of this ideology was that conflict and contestation should be eschewed in 
favour of harmony and consensus. Although Goh dabbled in culturalist rationales for 
avoiding political contention, depicting the latter as antithetical to the so-called Asian way 
of putting the group ahead of the individual, the running on this particular front during 
the 1990s was primarily made by Lee Kuan Yew/ In any case, the currency of  such rhetoric 
was greatly diminished with the advent of  the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis when the 
"Asian way" became too closely associated with corruption and economic mismanagement. 
Against this background, Goh's distinctive ideological contribution was to enrich and 
amplify the idea of  consensus politics through notions of civic engagement that favoured 
non-competitive politics. 
This new conceptualisation of  state-society relations manifested itself  in detailed form in 
the government's Singapore 21 vision statement, released in April 1999.8 The central theme 
of  this report was the need to complete the process of  nation building and to develop a social 
and political model that more effectively incorporated citizens into public life. The loose 
model contained in the report emphasised the partnership between government, the private 
sector and the people. The instrumental nature of this "partnership" was most explicitly 
explained vis-C.-vis the discussion of  "civic groups" and how they could be harnessed to the 
national interest. The encouragement of  "active citizenship" by the government had much 
less to do with the acknowledgement of  any right to involvement in public decision-making 
by Singaporeans than with the purported technical benefits of; drawing on wider expertise 
to help the government develop its policy, and the political benefits of regime stability by 
giving people a sense of involvement in the policy process. 
However, attempts to exploit such official rhetoric by beginning to forge genuinely 
independent political spaces were given short shrift. In 2000, for example, the Associa-
tion of Muslim Professionals (AMP) challenged the monopoly right of Mendaki-the 
PAP-dominated council for  the development of the Muslim: c.ommunity-to represent 
ethnic Malays! The AMP proposed a "collective  leadership;: comprising "independent 
non-political" Malays to break the PAP stranglehold, a position argued on the basis that 
this was in keeping with the spirit of  "active citizenship" being espoused by Goh's govern-
ment.!O Goh reprimanded the AMP for its proposal, warning the organisation not to stray 
into the political arena. The AMP retreated, publicly declaring that it never had any desire 
to get involved in politics.11  This highlighted a contradiction inherent in the consensus 
politics of the PAP: the absence of  genuinely independent political spaces through which 
the full range of views could be established before consensus is reached. 
One of the most comprehensive expressions of Goh's consensus politics is  found in 
the deliberations and report of the Remaking Singapore Committee (2003).12 The Com-
mittee's deliberations involved an extensive review of the government's social, political and 
cultural policies premised on the notion that Singaporeans need to "meet the challenges 
arising from our economic restructuring and stresses on our various social fault lines". The 
Committee consulted as  many as 10,000 Singaporeans at home and abroad, leading to 
seventy-four recommendations in the final report. Since the government accepted sixty of 
those recommendations, Goh was able to depict the exercise as proof positive of how his 
consensus politics involved Singaporeans in setting the direction for the country. Arguably, 
though, the most significant content in the Committee's report was in the appendix, which 
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These included changes to defamation laws to enhance free speech, and media liberalisa-
tion to improve the range and accessibility of information, There were also suggestions on 
how to implement a more level political playing field, such as adequate time between the 
announcement of new electoral boundaries and the holding of elections and transparency 
in the drawing of electoral boundaries, 
As the Remaking Singapore Committee exercise revealed, "political consensus" must be 
broadly consistent with the PAP reform agenda, That which is not is, almost by definition, 
a matter of conflict and cannot be accommodated, Indeed, along with assorted pronounce-
ments on consensus politics, Goh warned that those out to undermine the Government or 
wrest political control from the ruling party could expect "an extremely robust" response,13 
As will be seen below, this was no idle threat, 
Consolidating Legal  and Administrative Controls 
Goh's more relaxed and affable personality combined with his political consensus reforms 
gave the impression of a softening of authoritarian rule, Yet a hard edge remained to that 
rule which Goh helped consolidate, notably through shoring up the legal and administrative 
constraints on political competition with, and criticism of, his government. This direction 
gathered momentum after widespread international condemnation ofInternal Security Act 
arrests in 1987 of22 social activists for allegedly engaging in a"Marxist conspiracy" to bring 
down the Singapore state,l4 The PAP sought a form of authoritarian rule within which 
political repression and persecution were less conspicuously linked to the discretionary 
powers of the PAP government. 
A shift in emphasis towards legal and administrative techniques )'las in significant part 
possible because by the 1980s the state-party fusion embodied a vast network of informal 
PAP political connections and appointments, Since Lee had a hand in all important appoint-
ments, he could confidently step down and still exert considerable political influence within 
the state regardless of whether he remained part of the government. Government-linked 
corporations  (GLCs)  had evolved  such that,  increasingly,  they provided vital levers  of 
economic power controlled from outside formal political structures, As the chairman of 
the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, responsible .for the investment of 
Singapore's vast foreign reserves, Lee was strategically placed to act if necessary, As Prime 
Minister, Goh replenished that PAP network as the need arose, and adjusted and updated 
the laws and procedures administered by this network to keep executive authority resilient 
in the face of technological change and other dynamics, 
One of  Lee's most significant legacies was a system of  rule by law as well as rule oflaw,15 In 
various international evaluations of the Singapore legal system conducted by management 
and business-oriented organisations, the city-state has enjoyed strong endorsements for its 
quality, administrative efficiency and technological innovation, This includes reports and 
studies by the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), Political and Economic 
Risks Consultancy (PERC) and the International Institute for Management Development 
(IMD),16 Yet the integrity of the legal system has also been called into question by a range 
of reputable international legal and human rights bodies, including the Bar Association of 
the City of New York,'7 the International Commission of  Jurists,  18 Amnesty International 
(2006)'9 and Asia Watch (1989),'° all of which allege that Singapore's courts have been 
responsible for political persecution of  government opponents, 
Goh's  continuity with  Lee  extended to  using litigation  against political  opponents 
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would-be political combatants. This is likely to have been one political technique Lee was 
eager to see firmly entrenched by his successor. If  Goh did come under pressure to carry this 
baton, his failure to resist it had important ramifications. Indeed, it was during Goh's period 
as Prime Minister that reflex resort to defamation actions became a generalised technique 
of the PAP leadership. This practice included joint actions comprising up to a dozen PAP 
leaders, calculated to compound financial injury to the defendant. Goh and other PAP 
leaders' suits eventually led to the bankruptcies, and hence ineligibility for parliamentary 
elections, of two of the opposition's most fearless  characters: J.B. Jeyaretnam and Chee 
Soon  Juan. Over the years, the former had faced a string oflegal actions involving payments 
in excess  of $1.3 million. His bankruptcy in 2001 occurred in the wake of defamation 
suits relating to an article in the Workers' Party newspaper in 1995, brought by Foreign 
Minister S.Jayakumar and other PAP MPs, and separate suits emanating from the 1997 
General Election campaign involving Goh and other senior PAP leaders. Chee was declared 
a  bankrupt in 2006 after failing to pay Goh and Lee Kuan Yew  $500,000 in damages 
awarded in 2001 for defamation. Defamation suits also led to a third opponent, Tang Liang 
Hong, fleeing the country immediately after the 1997 General Election to avoid Singapore's 
courts. Tang was found guilty in absentia in 1997, with $3.63 million damages awarded to 
Goh and other plaintiffs. He was declared a bankrupt in February 1998. 
Media scrutiny and criticism was no less a target of Goh's litigation. For example, Goh 
teamed up with Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his son, Deputy Prime Minister Lee 
Hsien Loong, in an action against the International Herald Tribune over a 1994 article which 
resulted in $950,000 damages against the newspaper. Court actions have supplanted the 
expulsion of  journalists as a means of  discouraging critical reportingi Costly losses of  access 
to circulation and advertising markets have also generally persuaded foreign publishers 
to  a  more cautious and circumspect reporting of Singapore affairs.  Goh's government 
reinforced the threat posed by the Amendments to the Newspaper and Printing Presses 
Act in 1986 providing the capacity to restrict the circulation of  foreign publications deemed 
to be "engaging in domestic politics".  Like his predecessor, Goh repeatedly asserted the 
"right of reply" over content he took exception to in the international media circulating 
in Singapore. 
Lee pioneered the use of defamation suits and media intimidation. However, Goh and 
other senior Cabinet colleagues helped to embed them within the leadership's political culture. 
Significantly, much of  this was in concert with Lee Kuan  Yew, who made it clear that he expected 
his example to be followed. Goh fully met this expectation. 
Lee  Kuan  Yew  used  different  means  to  deal  with  organised,  collective  political 
challenges. Through the Societies Act, civil society-and links betweert civil society and 
opposition parties-was effectively stymied by outlawing engagement in politics by groups 
not specifically registered for that purpose. However, over time Lee supplemented this 
and other repressive legislation with reliance on procedural and administrative techniques 
to obstruct political activism. These techniques varied, but included regulations covering 
licences and permits required for public rallies and the dissemination of  political materials. 
So effective were these techniques, deployed under Goh in delaying and blocking political 
engagement by opponents, that a frustrated Singapore Democratic Party leader, Chee Soon 
Juan, ddiberately breached the Public Entertainment Licensing Act in 1999 and 2002 to 
highlight the problems.21  Both violations resulted in his imprisonment. 
During Goh's time at the helm of  the PAP, new measures refined the manner and condi-
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effect in 2001 and required a public record of donors giving more than $5,000 political 
donations in a financial year. Taken at face value, this appears an eminently reasonable move 
towards increased political transparency, but in a context where it seemed possible that 
donations to opposition parties might lead to political persecution, the legislation impaired 
the opposition's already meagre fund raising capacities. The Registry of  Political Donations 
also announced that two non-party-political organisations registered with the Registry of 
Companies and Businesses-the Open Singapore Society and the Think Centre-would 
be considered political associations, making them subject to the Act. This ensured that 
supporters of  embryonic civil society organisations would be brought under the same close 
scrutiny as those of formal political organisations. 
Goh's government also bolstered the constraints on free expression in contending with 
potential challenges posed by new electronic media technologies. Through the Singapore 
Broadcasting Authority (SBA) (Class License) Notification in 1996 and the Internet Code 
of Practice in 1997, Goh's government introduced one of the most ambitious and intrusive 
systems of  regulations anywhere in the world to try and limit the political use of  the Internet. 
The SBA was given wide scope to interpret what material was "objectionable on the grounds 
of  public interest, public order, public security, national harmony, or is otherwise prohibited 
by applicable Singapore laws". The Singapore Broadcasting (Amendment) Bill of 2001 also 
brought rules governing foreign broadcasters into line with regulations for print media 
barring "interference in domestic politics': In the same year, the Parliamentary Elections 
Act was amended to superimpose the spirit of the Societies Act on the Internet, namely 
special sensitivity to, and regulation of, what is  officially deemed to be political activity. 
Websites not registered as political organisations were barred from political promotion 
or campaigning during elections, and the use of mass email mess~ges containing political 
advocacy by individuals was also curtailed.  . 
Meanwhile, there was a noticeable loosening up in the letters to the editor pages-the 
Forum columns-of Singapore's daily English-language newspaper, The  Straits  Times. 
While certain issues still remained off limits, critical political expressions by individuals 
nevertheless appeared to be gaining increased official tolerance at the same time as  the 
clamp on the mobilisation of independent, collective expressions remained tight. 
Rewarding  and  Punishing through the State 
Historically, the emergence of the authoritarian regime in Singapore was associated with 
an expanding state role in the economic and social sectors. There was nothing intrinsi-
cally authoritarian about this. Indeed, pressing employment, housing and healthcare needs 
contributed to the understandable PAP view that the state had a responsibility to help 
address these issues. However, the particular way that social and economic activities were 
carried out by the PAP became integral to the authoritarian regime. First, whereas the 
PAP generally welcomed international investment, it was more cautious about domestic 
capitalists-notably the ethnic Chinese business community, elements of  which had been 
critical of the PAP and supported its political opponents in the 1960s. By expanding the 
economic role of the state, the PAP kept these forces at bay while developing the capital 
and power base of the PAP state. Second, fostering heavy reliance on the state for a wide 
range of social and economic resources facilitated political paternalism and retribution. 
Meanwhile, ideas of citizenship rights and welfare entitlements were discouraged. 
Underlying political economy relationships of dependence were in place before Goh 
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savings had facilitated reliance on state housing for more than 80 per cent of the popula-
tion. GLCs also dominated the commanding heights of the domestic economy, including 
the financial and telecommunications sectors, while the reach of statutory bodies meant 
that many job opportunities and access to business contracts were state-controlled. These 
structural realities favoured political docility. Goh further capitalised on state dependence 
for overt political advantage. 
Goh embarked on pioneering election-eve initiatives for the spending of budget sur-
pluses, much of which emanate from Singapore's profitable GLCs and public enterprises. 
So considerable was the capital at the disposal of GLCs by the 1990s that internationalisa-
tion became central to their accumulation strategies. Meanwhile, the government's fiscal 
surpluses assumed a strategic political significance as  Singapore's increasing exposure to 
the forces of economic globalisation translated into rising material inequalities and living 
costs. Three months before the 2001 General Election, Goh announced the New Singapore 
Shares scheme under which part of the budget surpluses over the next five years would be 
distributed to the population. Singaporeans were to be given between $200 and $1,700 
worth of  "shares'; which would return annual dividends from the government. At a cost 
of $2.7 billion,  Goh's  administration cleverly utilised public money to project itself as 
benevolent while still denouncing  "welfarism". This strategy was replicated by his successor, 
Lee Hsien Loong, who went into the May 2006 General Election offering Singaporeans 
a  $2.6 billion "Progress  Package" in an apparent attempt to  bolster electoral support. 
Not surprisingly, Lee rejected suggestions of this public spending as  driven by electoral 
considerations, contending that it was part of a continuing effort to ensure Singapore is 
"strong, prosperous and happy, for many years to come".22 
Goh was also a trendsetter in exploiting dependence on the state to refine electoral 
intimidation.23  Over 80 per cent of Singaporeans live in properties purchased from the 
government on 99-year leases. Pressuring voters in opposition-held wards prior to the 
1997 and  2001  elections,  Goh was  explicit about political  discrimination  in  publicly 
funded housing estate upgrading programmes. On the eve of the 1997 polls he warned 
that opposition estates risked eventually becoming  "slums".24 Goh supplemented this tactic 
in 2001 with promises of upgrading to those precincts within the opposition constituency 
of Potong Pasir where more than half the electorate supported the PAp'25  This carrot and 
stick approach was also a feature of the 2006 electoral campaigns for Potong Pasir and the 
other opposition-held seat of Hougang, both of which involved Goh as strategic advisor to 
the PAP candidates.26 
Goh openly stated that state funds would be used for upgrading those constituencies 
that voted for the PAP. In the process, he made it abundantly clear that paternalism and 
intimidation are two sides of the same authoritarian coin in Singapore. 
Conclusion 
Given the careful and detailed nature of  the PAP's political renewal processes, it was never 
possible that Lee  Kuan Yew's  successor or his Cabinet colleagues  would embark on a 
dismantling of the authoritarian regime, incrementally or otherwise. Yet this did not mean 
that the regime would stand stilL On the contrary, Lee had already begun modifying the 
system to enhance the durability of its essential features. The Goh administration entered 
into that process, devoting special attention and creativity to the refinement of the mecha-
nisms for political co-option and the ideology rationalising the de facto one-party state. 
Rapid capitalist development and attendant social changes had placed pressures on some GOH'S CONSENSUS POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE  69 
of the established institutions and values. Yet Goh provided an effective political response 
and demonstrated that there is no inevitability that such pressures lead to a weakening of 
authoritarian regimes. On the contrary, he resigned from the leadership in 2004 not only 
against the backdrop of a resounding electoral victory, capturing 75 per cent of the valid 
votes and immense personal popularity, but also in a Singapore where the clamp on any 
form of organised, collective political competition remained as tight and effective as when 
he first led the party. 
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